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Abstract 
People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How 
do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both maximize self-interest and maintain 
a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we tested this 
possibility. Across three experiments, participants decided how to split money with 
anonymous partners, and were later asked to recall their decisions. Participants 
systematically recalled being more generous in the past than they actually were, even 
when they were incentivized to recall accurately. Crucially, this effect was driven by 
individuals who gave less than what they personally believed was fair, independent of 
how objectively selfish they were.  Our findings suggest that when people’s actions fall 
short of their own personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their 
selfishness, thereby warding off negative emotions and threats to their moral self-image. 
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Significance statement 
Fairness is widely endorsed in human societies, but less often practiced. Here we 
demonstrate how memory distortions may contribute to this discrepancy. Across three 
experiments (N = 1005), we find that people consistently remember being more generous 
in the past than they actually were. We show that this effect occurs specifically for 
individuals whose decisions fell below their own fairness standards, irrespective of how 
high or low those standards were. These findings suggest that when people perceive their 
own actions as selfish, they can remember having acted more equitably, thus minimizing 
guilt and preserving their self-image.  
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Humans tend to see themselves as fair and honest (1–3), yet many stray from such ideals 
when they can get away with it (4, 5). Indeed, people’s actions are more often thought to 
reflect a desire to appear moral to themselves and others, than to truly align their 
behavior with moral principles (6, 7). Maintaining a positive moral self-image not only 
bolsters psychological well-being and physical health (8, 9), but also yields downstream 
social benefits. Individuals who appear committed to moral rules are viewed as more 
attractive social partners (10, 11) – and one dependable strategy for convincing others of 
one’s morality is to first convince oneself of it (12, 13).  
How can people preserve their moral self-image while simultaneously acting 
selfishly? Social scientists have identified a number of motivated biases and tactics that 
help people accomplish this feat. For one, people tend to balance self-interest with their 
moral values – for instance, lying just enough to profit financially, but not so much as to 
harm their moral self-image (7). In addition, people psychologically distance themselves 
from their unethical actions – attributing past misdeeds to situational pressures (14), or 
having been a “different person”  at the time (15). Moreover, people exploit uncertainty – 
behaving more selfishly when the consequences for others are ambiguous (16), and 
avoiding information about how their actions may have harmed others (17, 18).  
Another way people may preserve their moral self-image is by exploiting the 
malleability of episodic memory. When people’s actions fall short of their own standards, 
they might implicitly or explicitly devote less effort to encoding such experiences, and/or 
later distort memories in their favor. Such strategies would allow people to overestimate 
the extent to which their past actions were consistent with their personal standards for 
the situation (19). This idea coheres with evidence that people are able to “suppress”  
MOTIVATED MISREMEMBERING 5 
awareness of unwanted memories at both encoding and retrieval (20, 21), as well as 
evidence that memories for dishonest behavior (e.g., cheating) are less vivid than 
memories of honest actions (22). Such work suggests that the subjective experience (i.e., 
vividness) of recalling unethical actions may be impaired. However, it is less clear 
whether the objective details (i.e., accuracy) of such memories are affected, as initial 
work on this question has yielded mixed results (22–24).  
Importantly, these two features of memory are dissociable: impaired vividness 
(e.g., foggy mental imagery for the moment you tipped a barista yesterday) does not 
necessarily imply impaired accuracy (e.g., misremembering how much you actually 
tipped the barista), and vice-versa (15, 25, 26). Vividness and accuracy are not only 
psychologically dissociable, but also neurally dissociable at memory retrieval (27). 
This leaves open the question of whether memory accuracy may serve as another 
mechanism through which individuals can act selfishly and ultimately still feel moral. 
When behaving unfairly (e.g., giving a stingy tip), people may misremember the extent of 
their selfishness, thus preserving the view that they treat others fairly. To our knowledge, 
it is unknown whether people engage in such motivated misremembering of selfish 
actions – that is, remembering having been more generous than they truly were.  
Here, we tested this possibility. Across three experiments, we investigated 
whether selfish decisions are misremembered as objectively more generous. We 
predicted that this effect would be evident among more selfish individuals, and 
particularly those whose actions violate their own standard of fairness. Our prediction 
was specific to fairness “violators” , as we posited that motivated misremembering serves 
chiefly to reduce dissonance when an individual’s actions threaten their stable, moral 
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self-image (28). By focusing on personal standards of fairness in two of our experiments, 
we accounted for an important feature of social decision-making: people who exhibit 
objectively selfish behavior may not subjectively perceive their behavior as selfish (29). 
Crucially, here, we measured each individual’s subjective threshold for what counts as a 
fair (versus selfish) decision, and examined how this subjective threshold shapes the 
accuracy of memories for past social decisions.  
 
Exper iment 1 
Experiment 1 tested whether people remember being more generous than they actually 
were. Participants were given the opportunity to share money with anonymous partners. 
Later, in a surprise memory test we asked participants to report how much they 
remembered giving and financially incentivized them to be accurate. We predicted that 
participants would recall being more generous than they actually were, and that this effect 
would be stronger in relatively more selfish participants. 
 
Method  
112 participants (57 female, 50 male, 5 did not specify; mean age = 22.0) 
recruited from the University of Zürich participant database completed the experiment. 
We focused our recruitment on individuals who had not previously participated in 
experiments involving dictator games. Three participants were excluded for being 
extreme outliers (i.e., > 4 standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory 
errors - our key dependent measure. This left a total sample of 109 participants. To test 
the robustness of our results, we confirmed that our findings remained consistent when 
MOTIVATED MISREMEMBERING 7 
we additionally exclude subjects who never chose to give money in our task (N=18), as 
well as when we include all participants in our analyses (see SI Appendix). 
 
Procedure. This experiment was conducted in the Experimental Laboratory at the 
Department of Economics, University of Zurich. Data were collected across five 
experimental sessions, with the number of participants per session ranging from 11 to 30. 
Participants provided their informed consent and then received instructions for the 
experiment. They were instructed that their responses would remain confidential and 
anonymous and that they would receive a payment of CHF 10 for participation in the 
experiment, as well as an additional payment based on one of their choices during the 
experiment, which they would receive in cash at the end of the session.  
All participants were assigned to the role of dictator for a series of five modified 
dictator games, each with a unique anonymous partner. As dictators, participants made 
decisions about an endowment whose size could range from CHF 10 to CHF 30. For each 
of their five decisions, participants had to select what percentage of the endowment they 
would like to keep for themselves, and what percentage they would transfer to the 
anonymous recipient, in 10% increments ranging from [Keep 100%, Send 0%] to [Keep 
0%, Send 100%]. They were informed that one of their decisions would be randomly 
selected and implemented, and that the size of the endowment would also be randomly 
determined.  
After making their five decisions, participants completed demographic measures 
(age, gender, education) as well as a test of numeracy (30). The numeracy test took 
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approximately 5 minutes, ensuring that participants’  previous dictator game decisions 
would no longer be in their short-term memory (31). 
Finally, participants were presented with a surprise incentivized memory test in 
which they were asked to recall their previous decisions and indicate what percent of the 
endowment, on average, they transferred to the recipient. To motivate participants to 
recall their decisions accurately, they were informed that they would receive an 
additional CHF 5 if their response was within 10% of their actual average transfer. 
Memory measures. Of central interest in all three experiments was the difference 
between the actual average percentage each participant gave, and their memory of the 
average percentage they gave. To address this, we conducted two complementary 
analyses: 
Self-serving memory errors. We were specifically interested in whether people 
would remember giving more than they actually gave – that is, if they would make self-
serving memory errors1. We measured this tendency by taking into account the direction 
of participants’  memory errors: positive values indicated a participant recalled giving 
more than they actually gave (i.e., a self-serving memory error), and negative values 
indicated that they recalled giving less than they actually gave (i.e., a self-defeating 
memory error). Memory errors were not normally distributed (Wshapiro-wilk = .70, p < .001), 
thus we report non-parametric statistics for all key comparisons.  
Memory accuracy. In addition, we examined memory accuracy. To do so we 
computed the absolute difference between participant’s actual and recalled generosity 
                                               
1 We operationalize motivated misremembering as the occurrence of self-serving memory 
errors in our task. These two terms are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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(i.e., the size of memory errors). This allowed us to assess which group tended to make 
larger memory errors (independent of whether they remembered giving more or less than 
they actually gave). 
Control measures. Importantly, we also assessed three factors that we predicted 
would impact memory accuracy: (i) decision speed – the average reaction time of each 
participant’s five decisions, (ii) decision variance – the standard deviation of their five 
decisions, and (iii) non-giving – whether or not they ever gave a positive amount across 
their five decisions. Our key results remain the same controlling for these factors, as such 
we report analyses of these measures in the SI Appendix.  
Code and data availability. Access to raw data for Experiments 1 and 2 is 
restricted by the University of Zurich Ethics Commission. Raw data for Experiment 3, as 
well as analysis code for all three experiments, are publicly available in a GitHub 
repository at https://github.com/carlsonrw/motivated_Mem 
 
Results  
To test whether people recalled being more generous than they actually were, we 
examined participants’  self-serving memory errors. If participants were equally likely to 
make memory errors in either direction, these errors should cancel out at the group level, 
and the mean of participants’  recalled generosity should closely approximate the mean of 
their actual generosity. However, we found that participants showed a systematic bias 
towards self-serving memory errors, such that recalled generosity was significantly 
greater than actual generosity (Vwilcoxon.sign-ranked = 1345.5, p = .021, d = .23, Cliff’ s δ = 
.14). Since we predicted that misremembering would specifically occur among more 
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selfish participants, we performed a median split based on participants average transfers, 
dividing them into a behaviorally selfish group (N = 53, average generosity = 10.1%) and 
a behaviorally generous group (N = 56, average generosity = 42.4%).  
As predicted, selfish participants showed a bias towards self-serving memory 
errors, such that they remembered transferring significantly more than they actually did 
(V = 335.5, p = .003, d = .34, δ = .23; Fig. 1A), whereas generous participants showed no 
such difference (V = 353, p = .54, d = .13, δ = .05). However, there was no significant 
difference in the extent of this bias between selfish participants and generous participants 
(Wwilcoxon.rank-sum = 1292.5, p = .23, d = .19, δ = .13). 
Next we tested if the two groups differed in memory accuracy – or the absolute 
size of their memory errors. We found no significant difference between selfish and 
generous behaving participants in memory accuracy (W = 1730.5, p = .12, d = .21, δ = 
.17; SI Appendix, Fig. S1A). 
 
Exper iment 2 
In Experiment 1, we found that participants recalled being more generous than 
they truly were, despite being incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. As 
predicted, this motivated misremembering effect was evident among participants who 
behaved selfishly, but not those who behaved generously. However, the extent of 
motivated misremembering did not significantly differ between these groups.  
One explanation for this latter finding is that by only measuring overt behavior, 
we failed to capture the extent to which people’s decisions truly aligned with, versus 
violated, their personal standards of fairness for the situation. Indeed, by defining 
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individuals as “generous”  or “selfish”  by their actions alone, Experiment 1 could not to 
assess the potential role that people’s unique moral beliefs play in motivated 
misremembering. If motivated misremembering is primarily driven by a desire to reduce 
threats to one’s moral self-image, self-serving memory errors should occur chiefly when 
people’s actions fall short of their own personal standards, independent of how 
objectively high or low those standards may be. In Experiment 2, we tested this 
possibility.  
In particular, we examined whether giving less than one’s own fairness standard 
drives motivated misremembering. To test this idea, before participants made their 
decisions, we probed their subjective threshold for what would count as a fair, versus 
selfish, amount to give. We predicted that, independent of how much participants actually 
gave, motivated misremembering would occur specifically among those participants 
whose true generosity fell short of what they personally believed was a fair amount to 
give. 
 
Method  
243 participants (118 female, 125 male; mean age = 22.8) recruited from the 
University of Zürich participant database completed the experiment. We focused our 
recruitment on participants who had not previously participated in experiments involving 
dictator games, however due to an administrative oversight there were five participants 
who did not meet this criterion but nonetheless participated in the experiment, which was 
discovered after data collection. These five participants were excluded from further 
analysis. Four additional participants were excluded for being extreme outliers (i.e., > 4 
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standard deviations from the mean) in the size of their memory errors. This left a total 
sample of 234 participants. Our findings remain consistent when we also exclude subjects 
who never chose to give money in our task (N=51), as well as when we include all 
participants in our analyses (see SI Appendix). 
Procedure. Experiment 2 was conducted in the Experimental Laboratory at the 
Department of Economics, University of Zurich. Data were collected across 13 
experimental sessions, with the number of participants per session ranging from 10 to 31. 
Participants provided their informed consent and then were presented with the 
instructions for the experiment. They were instructed that their responses would remain 
confidential and anonymous and that they would receive a payment of CHF 10 for 
participation in the experiment, as well as an additional payment based on one of their 
choices during the experiment, which they would receive in cash at the end of the 
session.  
As in Experiment 1, participants were instructed that they would be playing a 
dictator game in which they would be paired anonymously with another participant. They 
were further instructed that one of the participants (Participant 1) would decide how to 
divide a sum of money between themselves and the other participant (Participant 2), and 
were informed that their role would be revealed to them at a later point in time. We 
probed participants’  fairness standards by asking them to indicate what they believed to 
be the “maximum acceptable share”  for Participant 1 (the decider) to keep. Half of 
participants indicated their fairness standards before learning they were assigned the role 
of Participant 1, and the other half indicated their fairness standard after they learning 
their role. The timing of the fairness standards question had no influence on the results, 
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and thus we collapsed across these conditions in all analyses for Experiment 2 (see SI 
Appendix for more details). Finally, participants completed a series of five transfer 
decisions, each with an anonymous partner.  
Next, participants completed demographic measures (age, gender, education) as 
well as a test of numeracy for approximately five minutes (30). Finally, participants were 
presented with a surprise incentivized memory test in which they were asked to 
remember their previous decisions and indicate what proportion of the endowment, on 
average, they transferred to the recipient. They were informed that they would receive an 
additional CHF 5 if their response was within 10% of their actual average transfer.  
 
Results 
In Experiment 2, participants again showed a systematic bias towards self-serving 
memory errors, such that their recalled generosity was significantly greater than their 
actual generosity (V = 4450, p = .003, d = .21, δ = .11). However, we were specifically 
interested in testing if this effect is driven by violating one’s personal standards. To test 
this possibility, we began by separately assessing memory errors in participants who (on 
average) gave less than what they indicated was fair (fairness violators, N = 69, average 
generosity = 22.3%), versus those who gave at least as much as what they indicated was 
fair (fairness upholders, N = 165, average generosity = 23.7%).  
As predicted, we found that fairness violators recalled being significantly more 
generous than they actually were (V = 1396.5, p < .001, d = .54, δ = .38; Fig. 1B), but this 
was not the case for fairness upholders (V = 838, p = .89, d = .02, δ < 0.01). In addition, 
when comparing the two groups directly, fairness violators also showed a significantly 
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greater bias toward self-serving memory errors (W = 3710, p < .001, d = .68, δ = .35). 
Fairness violators were also less accurate in general, such that they made larger memory 
errors (W = 2787.5, p < .001, d = .70, δ = .51; SI Appendix, Fig. S1B). 
To confirm that motivated misremembering is driven primarily by violating one’s 
personal standard of fairness, rather than being objectively selfish, we next assessed 
whether participant’s objective level of generosity would still show an influence on 
memory when excluding fairness violators from analyses. In other words, does motivated 
misremembering occur among those who give objectively lower amounts, but do not 
violate their own fairness standard? To test this, we performed a median split on the 
generosity of only fairness upholders, dividing them into a behaviorally selfish group (N 
= 82, average generosity = 6.3%) and a behaviorally generous group (N = 83, average 
generosity = 40.9%).  
In support of our hypothesis that violating one’s personal standards drives 
misremembering, we found no evidence of a bias towards self-serving memory errors in 
either behaviorally selfish (V = 112, p = .51, d = .07, δ = .04) nor behaviorally generous 
fairness upholders (V = 332.5, p = .42, d = .02, δ = -.04). Moreover, we found no 
difference between behaviorally selfish versus generous fairness upholders in their 
tendency to make self-serving memory errors (W = 3179, p = .39, d = .09, δ = .07). 
These results provide initial support for the idea that personal standards can 
influence how people remember their generosity. If this is the case, then recalled 
generosity should be accounted for not just by actual generosity, but also by the extent to 
which actual generosity deviates from personal standards. To formally test this 
possibility, we compared a model predicting recalled generosity from actual generosity, 
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with one predicting recalled generosity from both actual generosity and the deviation 
between actual generosity and personal standards. Importantly, we controlled for four 
other predictors of memory accuracy in each model: decision speed (the average time 
participant’s took to make their decisions), decision variance (the standard deviation of 
their decisions), non-giving (whether or not they ever gave a positive amount across their 
decisions), and numeracy (their math performance on the buffer task). As predicted, we 
found that the model which additionally included fairness deviations accounted for 
recalled generosity better than the simpler model that did not include fairness deviations 
as a predictor (ΔAIC = 11.47, ΔBIC = 8.02, χ2 (1) = 13.47, p < .001; SI Appendix, Table 
S3).  
 
Exper iment 3  
Building on our initial findings, Experiment 2 demonstrated that individuals who 
violated their own standard of fairness systematically made self-serving memory errors. 
This supports the idea that motivated misremembering may primarily serve to ward off 
negative moral emotions and threats to one’s moral self-image. Moreover, it highlights 
the importance of distinguishing selfishness as defined by behavior alone, from 
selfishness as it is perceived by social decision-makers – that is, relative to their own, 
unique moral benchmark for the situation. 
Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were incentivized to accurately recall how 
much they gave on average. However, these bonuses were fixed, such that they received 
a bonus if the average proportion they recalled giving was within 10% of their true 
average. In Experiment 3, we tested whether participants would still exhibit this effect if 
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the monetary bonus scaled directly with accuracy, such that even a 1% deviation in 
recalled generosity would reduce the participant’s bonus. In addition, we probed 
participants’  confidence in their recalled generosity to measure their subjective sense of 
accuracy. We also controlled for socially-desirable responding. Lastly, and most 
critically, we probed how participants’  decisions and subsequent memories impacted 
their affective state and moral self-view. We predicted that, among participants who 
violated their fairness standard, those exhibiting self-serving memory errors would report 
enhanced positive affect and moral self-views relative to those who did not. 
 
Method  
To determine our sample size for Experiment 3, we focused on achieving 
sufficient power within our main group of interest: fairness violators. A power analysis 
showed that a minimum sample size of N = 128 would be needed to attain approximately 
95% power to detect a small to medium-sized effect (d ≈ 0.30) at an alpha level of 0.05. 
Based on Experiment 2, we predicted that at least 25% of participants would violate their 
personal standard of fairness, and thus determined that a minimum total sample size of 
128 x 4 = 512 participants would be needed.  
647 participants (344 female, 301 male, 2 did not specify; mean age = 36.4) 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed the experiment. Since this 
experiment was conducted online, we also included a series of comprehension checks. 33 
participants were excluded for failing at least one of our comprehension checks. Finally, 
11 participants were excluded for being extreme outliers (i.e., > 4 standard deviations 
from the mean) in the size of their memory errors. This left a total sample of 604 
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participants. Our findings remain consistent when we also exclude subjects who never 
chose to give money in our task (N=100), as well as when we include all participants in 
our analyses (see SI Appendix). 
Procedure. The experimental protocol for Experiment 3 was largely identical to 
Experiment 2, with a few exceptions. The most crucial difference was how we 
incentivized the surprise memory test: participants were informed at the test that they 
would receive a scaling monetary bonus for accurately recalling their generosity, such 
that they would lose 2% of their bonus for each 1% their recalled average transfer rate 
deviated from their actual average transfer rate. Unlike the prior studies, participants were 
not informed of the size of this bonus until after the experiment. In addition, all 
participants in this experiment made fairness judgements without prior knowledge of 
whether they would be assigned as Participant 1 (the decider) or Participant 2 (the 
receiver).  
Memory confidence. Moreover, after recalling their average generosity, we asked 
participants to rate how confident they were in their recalled generosity on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all confident”) to 7 (“Extremely confident” ). 
Socially desirable responding. In addition, we probed participants’  tendency to 
engage in socially desirable responding using a short-form (10-item) version of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (32). This measure allowed us to rule out the 
possibility that motivated misremembering can be reduced to socially desirable 
responding. Our results remain the same when controlling for this factor (SI Appendix; 
Table S1, Table S2). 
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Psychological consequences. Lastly, we measured two factors that could shift as 
a function of whether an individual engaged in motivated misremembering: their 
affective state and their moral self-view. 
Affective state. To probe each participant’s affective state, we asked (i) how 
positive they felt in the moment, and (ii) how happy they felt in moment – both on 7-
point Likert scales ranging from 1 (“Not at all” ) to 7 (“Extremely”). These two items 
were closely related (α = .93), and thus were averaged together to form our final measure 
of participants’  affective state. 
Moral self-view. To probe each participant’s moral self-view, we asked (i) to what 
extent they considered themselves a good person, and (ii) to what extent they considered 
themselves moral – again on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (“Not at all” ) to 7 
(“Extremely”). These two items were highly related (α = .89), and thus were averaged 
together to form our final measure of participants’  moral self-view. 
 
Results  
We again found that participants showed a systematic bias towards self-serving 
memory errors – recalling giving significantly more than they actually gave (V = 
7990.5, p = .008, d = .13, δ = .05). Next, we used the same procedure as in Experiment 2 
to group participants as fairness violators (N = 143, average generosity = 16.0%), and 
fairness upholders (N = 461, average generosity = 35.9%).  
Replicating Experiment 2, we again found that fairness violators recalled being 
significantly more generous than they actually were (V = 1558.5, p < .001, d = .30, δ = 
.15; Fig. 1C), but fairness upholders did not (V = 2439, p = .69, d = .04, δ = .01). We also 
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found that fairness violators showed a greater bias toward self-serving memory errors 
than fairness upholders (W = 28390.5, p = .001, d = .43, δ = .14), and were less accurate 
than fairness upholders – making significantly larger memory errors (W = 24440.5, p < 
.001, d = .55, δ = .26; SI Appendix, Fig. S1C). 
To confirm that motivated misremembering is driven primarily by violating one’s 
personal standard of fairness, we again assessed whether those who did not violate their 
personal standards, but nonetheless behaved selfishly in an objective sense, would still 
tend to make self-serving memory errors. As such, we performed a median split on the 
generosity of only fairness upholders, dividing them into a behaviorally selfish (N = 230, 
average generosity = 20.4%) and behaviorally generous group (N = 231, average 
generosity = 51.5%).  
As predicted, we again did not find a bias towards self-serving memory errors in 
either behaviorally selfish (V = 1476.5, p = .11, d = .14, δ = .05) nor generous fairness 
upholders (V = 122.5, p = .11, d = .10, δ = -.02). Moreover, we also found no difference 
between selfish versus generous fairness upholders in their tendency to make self-serving 
memory errors (W = 24742.5, p = .073, d = .24, δ = .07). 
Next, as in Experiment 2, we compared a model predicting recalled generosity 
from actual generosity, with one predicting recalled generosity from both actual 
generosity and the deviation between actual generosity and personal standards. In each 
model, we also controlled for decision speed, decision variance, non-giving, numeracy, as 
well as trait social desirability. Replicating Experiment 2, we found that the model which 
additionally included fairness deviations again provided a superior fit (ΔAIC = 6.33, 
ΔBIC = 1.92, χ2 (1) = 8.33, p = .004; SI Appendix, Table S4).  
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Next, we turned to the novel measures included in Experiment 3. First, we probed 
participants’  confidence in their recalled generosity. We specifically focused on how 
memory confidence might differ between those who uphold, versus violate, their personal 
standards of fairness. Confidence ratings showed a strong correlation with overall 
memory accuracy (rs = .64, p < .001), but no relationship with self-serving memory errors 
(rs = .04, p = .37). Moreover, consistent with our predictions, fairness violators were 
significantly less confident in their recalled generosity than fairness upholders (W = 
39859.5, p < .001, d = .43, δ = .21; Fig. 2A). 
In addition, we investigated the consequences of self-serving memory errors on 
people’s self-image as well as their affective state. One function of self-serving memory 
errors may be to reduce negative emotions and/or threats to one’s self-image that can 
follow fairness violations. To test this hypothesis, we first probed how participants’  moral 
self-views and affective states changed as a function of their compliance with their 
fairness standards. Fairness violators and upholders viewed themselves as equally moral 
(W = 33717, p = .67, d = .07, δ = .02) and showed no differences in reported positive 
affect (W = 34647.5, p = .35, d = .11, δ = .05).  
Next, we tested if moral self-views and positive affect differed between fairness 
violators and upholders as a function on whether their memory errors were self-serving 
(inflating their generosity) or self-defeating (deflating their generosity). As such, for 
these analyses we focused on participants who made memory errors (N = 160). First, we 
assessed how fairness standard compliance and memory error direction affected moral 
self-views. We again found no main effect of violating (versus upholding) fairness 
standards (Hkruskal.wallis(1) = .18, p = .67), nor exhibiting self-serving (vs. self-defeating) 
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memory errors (H(1) = .14, p = .71) on participant’s moral self-views. There was also no 
significant interaction between fairness standard compliance and memory error direction 
(H(3) = 2.71, p = .44) on moral self-views.  
Finally, we assessed the consequences of fairness standard compliance and 
memory error direction on positive affect. There was also no main effect of fairness 
standard compliance (H(1) = .87, p = .35), nor memory error direction (H(1) = .97, p = 
.33) on participant’s reported positive affect. The interaction between fairness standard 
compliance and memory error direction on positive affect was also non-significant (H(3) 
= 5.39, p = .15). Since we specifically predicted that positive affect should be improved 
among fairness violators who made self-serving memory errors, we conducted an 
exploratory contrast to test whether positive affect differed specifically when fairness 
violators made self-serving (versus self-defeating) memory errors. For fairness violators, 
making self-serving (vs. self-defeating) memory errors significantly impacted positive 
affect (W = 301.5, p = .031, d = .56, δ = .33), such that violators who exhibited self-
serving memory errors were happier than those who did not (Fig. 2B). However, no such 
shift in positive affect was observed among fairness upholders (W = 1203.5, p = .68, d = 
.08, δ = .05).  
 
Discussion 
In The Descent of Man, Darwin wrote “A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting 
on his past actions and their motives – of approving of some and disapproving of others”  
(33). Here we offer one account of how people may fall short of Darwin’s moral 
criterion. Across three experiments, we found that people consistently recalled being 
MOTIVATED MISREMEMBERING 22 
more generous than they actually were. This occurred even when participants could 
receive a monetary bonus that directly scaled with their memory accuracy. Crucially, this 
effect was driven by a subset of individuals whose generosity fell short of what they 
personally believed was fair, independent of their explicit level of generosity. Such 
individuals not only showed more self-serving memory errors, but were also less 
confident in their memories compared to individuals who upheld their personal fairness 
standards. Our findings highlight the importance of assessing selfishness as it is 
perceived by social decision-makers – that is, relative to their own, subjective moral 
beliefs. More crucially, these findings contribute to a growing literature on the motivated 
nature of memory (22, 24, 34–37). 
These findings suggest that those who violate (as opposed to uphold) their 
personal standards tend to misremember the extent of their selfishness. However, it is 
also possible that these individuals were aware of their true level of generosity, yet were 
willing to pay a cost to claim having been more generous. This alternative explanation is 
not inconsistent with prior work (7). However, since those who exhibited such errors also 
had lower memory accuracy, were less confident in their memories, and were no more 
prone to socially desirable responding than those who reported their past behavior 
accurately, it seems more plausible that they were actually misremembering their 
decisions, rather than deliberately lying about them. 
A related literature suggests that memory is enhanced for emotional events (38) – 
and violating fairness standards may immediately induce negative emotions such as guilt 
(39). From this literature, one would expect fairness violations to be more memorable 
than morally-consistent decisions (23). This may be especially true of extreme moral 
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transgressions (e.g., physical harm), which may remain memorable to transgressors long 
after they occurred (40), or when one’s moral transgression was witnessed by others – 
which could elicit social emotions such as shame or embarrassment (41). Such contexts 
may indeed elicit a different self-serving strategy. If one’s moral conduct were witnessed 
by, or directly comparable to, the conduct of one’s peers, individuals might instead distort 
their moral view of others (e.g., viewing peers as being less moral than they truly are; 
(34). Crucially, here we focused on relatively minor fairness violations, which occurred 
anonymously. As such, we anticipated that the intensity of negative emotion experienced 
by agents would not be strong enough to elicit preferential encoding of their own actions 
– a prediction supported by the presence of self-serving memory errors across our three 
experiments. Ultimately, uncovering how memory for selfishness shifts as a function of 
(i) the degree of harm caused by the decision and (ii) the presence of others remain 
exciting and important directions for future work to explore. 
 If we accept the possibility that people can misremember their misdeeds, what 
cognitive and neural mechanisms might facilitate this effect? Motivated misremembering 
could plausibly emerge at any stage of memory (encoding, consolidation, or retrieval), 
and may occur incidentally or intentionally (20). One possibility is that selfish individuals 
incidentally misremember their decisions due to the goal-irrelevance of this information. 
Memory encoding is chiefly determined by attention (42), which in turn is guided by our 
goals (43). When making selfish decisions, individuals may simply be less motivated to 
attend to, and rehearse, their exact degree of generosity compared to when making fair 
decisions. As a consequence, fairness violators may misremember due to their most 
generous decisions being more accessible in memory, or incidentally conflating 
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memories of their true decisions with other knowledge, such as their belief about what 
constituted a fair decision (44, 45). 
Another possibility is that selfish individuals intentionally misremember their 
decisions in the service of reducing guilt and damage to their self-image (20, 46). To this 
end, individuals may deliberately suppress encoding, rehearsing, or retrieving decisions 
that violate their personal standards, thereby allowing them to recall acting more in line 
with their moral self-view. This latter account best captures the specificity of our memory 
findings: only fairness violators both consistently made self-serving memory errors, and 
experienced reliable emotional benefits from such errors. 
Importantly, these mechanisms of misremembering are neurally dissociable (20, 
47, 48). For instance, an incidental, goal-irrelevance account of misremembering would 
be more consistent with decreased functional connectivity between midbrain 
dopaminergic targets and hippocampus immediately following selfish decisions (47). In 
contrast, an intentional suppression account of misremembering would predict increased 
dorsolateral prefrontal activation and reduced hippocampal activation at encoding or 
retrieval, reflecting top-down control over memory (49, 50). Uncovering the neural 
mechanisms that give rise to misremembering selfishness remains an especially fruitful 
avenue for future research. Such work will allow for a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms by which memory operates in the service of one’s goals, and specifically, 
how the malleability of memory helps us maintain ethically spotless minds.  
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Here we show differences between the mean percent participant’s recalled giving, versus 
how much they actually gave. Positive values reflect “self-serving” memory errors. (A) In 
Experiment 1, selfish-behaving participants recalled being more generous than they actually 
were, but not generous-behaving participants. (B) In Experiment 2, we show that specifically 
individuals who violated their own personal standard of fairness recall being more generous than 
they actually were, but not fairness upholders. (C) In Experiment 3, we replicate the finding that 
fairness violators, but not fairness upholders, recall being more generous than they truly were. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM). This figure is re-visualized with all raw 
data points in the SI Appendix (Fig. S2). 
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Fig. 2. (A) In Experiment 3, we found that fairness violators reported being less confident in their 
memories than fairness upholders. (B) In addition, fairness violators who made self-serving 
memory errors reported greater positive affect than those who made self-defeating memory 
errors. Crucially, this difference was not observed among fairness upholders. Error bars reflect 
SEMs. This figure is re-visualized with all raw data points in the SI Appendix (Fig. S3). 
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Supplementary Information Text 
Study 1 results (with non-givers excluded and with no exclusions). To test the robustness of the 
findings in Study 1, we repeated our main analyses (i) while additionally excluding participants who 
never gave a positive amount across their five transfer decisions, and (ii) with no participants excluded. 
The former analyses are reported because individuals who never gave in our study were not expected to 
remember giving, nor could they possibly recall giving ‘ less’  than they actually did. As such, we wanted 
to ensure these individuals did not bias our results in anyway. The latter analyses were conducted simply 
to ensure our findings are robust to outliers. In both cases, the results were consistent with those reported 
in the main text. All analysis code is available at https://github.com/carlsonrw/motivated_Mem 
When including only those that gave a positive amount (N = 92), and when including all 
participants (N = 112), we again find that recalled generosity was significantly greater than actual 
generosity (Non-givers excluded: Vwilcoxon.sign-ranked = 1288, p = .029, d = .24, Cliff’s δ = .15; No 
exclusions: V = 1474.5, p = .018, d = .17, δ = .14). Moreover, after performing a median split to group 
participants as behaviorally selfish and behaviorally generous, we again find that selfish participants 
remembered transferring significantly more than they actually did (Non-givers excluded: V = 394.5, p = 
.004, d = .40, δ = .31; No exclusions: V = 394.5, p < .001, d = .35, δ = .25), whereas generous participants 
showed no such difference (Non-givers excluded: V = 264, p = .76, d = .09, δ = .02; No exclusions: V = 
353, p = .76, d = .01, δ = .04). In addition, selfish individuals trended towards making more self-serving 
memory errors than generous participants (Non-givers excluded: Wwilcoxon.rank-sum = 820, p = .067, d = .35, 
δ = .22; No exclusions: W = 1292.5, p = .098, d = .38, δ = .18). Finally, selfish and generous participants 
showed no differences in memory accuracy (Non-givers excluded: W = 991.5, p = .64, d = .07, δ = .06; 
No exclusions: W = 1785.5, p = .19, d = .05, δ = .14). 
 
Study 2 with non-givers excluded and with no exclusions. We also repeated our main analyses of 
Study 2 with non-givers excluded (N = 184), as well as with no exclusions (N = 243). As with Study 1, 
the results were consistent with those reported in the main text. 
We again found that participants showed a systematic bias towards self-serving memory errors, 
such that their recalled generosity was significantly greater than their actual generosity (Non-givers 
excluded: V = 3850, p = .017, d = .20, δ = .11; No exclusions: V = 4663, p = .019, d = .10, δ = .10). In 
addition, we replicated the finding that specifically fairness violators recalled being significantly more 
generous than they actually were (Non-givers excluded: V = 1289.5, p < .001, d = .53, δ = .36; No 
exclusions: V = 1399, p < .001, d = .46, δ = .36), but not fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: V = 
647, p = .41, d = .03, δ = -.03; No exclusions: V = 938, p = .63, d = .05, δ = -.01). Moreover, when 
comparing fairness violators and upholders directly, the former showed a significantly greater bias toward 
self-serving memory errors (Non-givers excluded: W = 2509.5, p < .001, d = .65, δ = .36; No exclusions: 
W = 4049, p < .001, d = .52, δ = .33). We also found that fairness violators were less accurate overall than 
fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: W = 2241, p < .001, d = .55, δ = .42, No exclusions: W = 
3115, p < .001, d = .43, δ = .49).  
Moreover, when we perform a median split on fairness upholders based on their generosity, we 
again find no significant difference between recalled generosity and actual generosity in either selfish 
(Non-givers excluded: V = 195.5, p = .88, d = .06, δ = .02; No exclusions: V = 132, p = .32, d = .12, δ = 
.05) nor generous fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: V = 130, p = .16, d = .16, δ = -.08; No 
exclusions: V = 357, p = .16, d = .16, δ = -.06). We also found no differences between generous versus 
selfish fairness upholders in self-serving memory errors (Non-givers excluded: V = 1580, p = .36, d = .18, 
δ = .09; No exclusions: W = 3376, p = .20, d = .29, δ = .10). 
In another replication, we found that a model which additionally included participant’s fairness 
deviations explained recalled generosity better than the model that did not, even when controlling for 
decision speed, decision variance, non-giving in both models (Non-givers excluded: ΔAIC = 6.85, ΔBIC 
= 3.64, χ2 (1) = 8.85, p = .003, No exclusions: ΔAIC = 16.77, ΔBIC = 13.27, χ2 (1) = 18.77, p < .001).  
 
 
 
 
 
Study 3 with non-givers excluded and with no exclusions. Lastly, we repeated our main analyses for 
Study 3 with non-givers excluded (N = 504), as well as with no participants excluded (N = 647). As with 
Studies 1 and 2, the results were consistent with those reported in the main text. 
We replicated the finding that participants showed a systematic bias towards self-serving memory 
errors, such that their recalled generosity was significantly greater than their actual generosity (Non-
givers excluded: V = 7835, p = .011, d = .14, δ = .05; No exclusions: V = 11047, p < .001, d = .16, δ = 
.06). In addition, we replicated the finding that specifically fairness violators recalled being significantly 
more generous than they actually were (Non-givers excluded: V = 1558.5, p < .001, d = .37, δ = .22; No 
exclusions: V = 2466.5, p < .001, d = .34, δ = .18), but not fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: V = 
2346.5, p = .81, d = .04, δ = .01; No exclusions: V = 2995.5, p = .39, d = .07, δ = .02). Moreover, when 
comparing fairness violators and upholders directly, the former showed a significantly greater bias toward 
self-serving memory errors (Non-givers excluded: W = 15741.5, p < .001, d = .60, δ = .21; No exclusions: 
W = 33184.5, p < .001, d = .39, δ = .16). We also found that fairness violators were less accurate overall 
than fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: W = 10901.5, p < .001, d = .85, δ = .45; No exclusions: 
W = 27948.5, p < .001, d = .46, δ = .29).  
In addition, when we group fairness upholders based on a median split on their average 
generosity, we again find either small or non-significant differences between recalled generosity and 
actual generosity for selfish (Non-givers excluded: V = 1530.5, p = .15, d = .14, δ = .06; No exclusions: 
V = 1645, p = .018, d = .19, δ = .07) and generous fairness upholders (Non-givers excluded: V = 89.5, p = 
.086, d = .10, δ = .03; No exclusions: V = 188, p = .062, d = .11, δ = -.03). Consistent with our 
predictions, we find much smaller differences between generous- and selfish-behaving fairness upholders 
in self-serving memory errors (Non-givers excluded: V = 18585, p = .047, d = .24, δ = .09; No exclusions: 
W = 26471.5, p = .011, d = .31, δ = .10), compared to when participants were grouped based on whether 
they violated or upheld their fairness standards. 
In another replication, we find that a model which included participant’s fairness deviations 
explained recalled generosity better than the model that did not when both models controlled for decision 
speed, decision variance, non-giving, numeracy, and social desirability (Non-givers excluded: ΔAIC = 
8.13, ΔBIC = 3.91, χ2 (1) = 10.13, p = .001; No exclusions: ΔAIC = 5.00, ΔBIC = .53, χ2 (1) = 7.00, p = 
.008). 
Finally, we tested the robustness of our findings regarding the emotional benefits of making self-
serving versus self-defeating memory errors. Replicating our key exploratory result, we find that for 
fairness violators, exhibiting self-serving (vs. self-defeating) memory errors significantly improved 
positive affect (Non-givers excluded: W = 301.5, p = .031, d = .56, δ = .33; No exclusions: W = 480.5, p = 
.039, d = .48, δ = .29), whereas no such effect was observed among fairness upholders (Non-givers 
excluded: W = 1196.5, p = .59, d = .10, δ = .06; No exclusions: W = 1352, p = .96, d = .01, δ = .01). 
 
 
Studies 1 and 2: additional methods and analyses 
 
Study 1 supplemental methods: choice presentation format. Choice options were presented in a 
graphical format for half the participants and a numeric format for the other half. This manipulation was 
carried out to address a separate research question and its results are reported separately. The effect of 
choice format did not interact with any of the effects tested in the current study, thus, for simplicity, 
results are presented collapsed across choice format conditions. 
 
Study 2 supplemental methods and results: role knowledge manipulation. In Study 2, we also tested 
whether motivated misremembering is more likely to occur when people deviate from a self-serving 
versus impartial standard of fairness. In the absence of personal incentives – for instance, when people are 
in the role of a third-party observer, or are behind a veil of ignorance – people’s beliefs about what is fair 
more closely reflect an impartial view (1). However, research on self-serving biases has shown that 
personal incentives can strongly influence beliefs about fairness, inducing people to conflate what is fair 
 
 
 
 
with what is personally advantageous (2). For example, in dictator games, beliefs about the size of a “ fair”  
transfer are lower for dictators than receivers (1). As such, here we additionally tested how such biases 
might influence the extent of misremembering among participants. 
To address this question, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the full 
knowledge condition, participants were informed that they were assigned to the role of Participant 1. 
Following this, participants were asked to indicate what they believed to be the “maximum acceptable 
share” for Participant 1 to keep. Finally, participants completed a series of five transfer decisions.  
In the veil of ignorance condition, participants were informed that their role would be revealed to 
them at a later point in time. Following this, participants were asked to indicate what they believed to be 
the “maximum acceptable share” for Participant 1 to keep. Next, participants were informed that they 
were assigned to the role of Participant 1. Finally, participants completed a series of five transfer 
decisions.  
Note that in the full knowledge condition, fairness beliefs were elicited after participants knew 
they would be the dictator and thus stood to profit from inequality. Thus, in this condition fairness beliefs 
reflect a combination of self-serving fairness beliefs and impartial fairness beliefs. Meanwhile, in the veil 
of ignorance condition, fairness beliefs were elicited before participants knew whether they would be the 
dictator or the recipient. Thus, in this condition fairness beliefs reflect impartial fairness beliefs only. 
Results. We examined whether memory accuracy was affected by making fairness judgments 
with full knowledge of one’s assigned role, versus under a veil of ignorance. We found that participants’  
beliefs about what constitutes a fair offer were no different when made under a veil of ignorance 
compared with full knowledge (W = 6198, p = .20). Participants’  generosity was also not significantly 
affected by whether they were assigned to the full knowledge or veil of ignorance condition (W = 5938, p 
= .078). We also observed no differences in fairness deviations (W = 6999.5, p = .75) nor memory 
accuracy (W = 6839, p = .99) between conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. S1. Here we show absolute differences between the mean percent participant’s recalled giving, 
versus how much they actually gave. Error bars represent SEMs. (A) In Study 1, the size of memory 
errors made by selfish-behaving participants did not differ from those made by generous-behaving 
participants. (B) In Study 2, however, we find that personal fairness violators made larger memory errors 
than fairness upholders. (C) In Study 3, we again find that fairness violators made larger memory errors 
than fairness upholders. This figure is re-plotted with all raw data in Fig. S5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S2. Here we re-visualize Figure 1 of the main text with raw data points included. Errors bars reflect 
95% confidence intervals (CIs). 
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Fig. S3. Here we re-visualize Fig. 2 of the main text with raw data points included. Errors bars reflect 
95% CIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. S4. Here we re-visualize Fig. S1 with raw data points included. Errors bars reflect 95% CIs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S1. Correlations between memory accuracy and control var iables across all three studies. 
  
  memory error size  
Study 1 decision variance .69** 
 decision speed .28** 
 non-giving .39** 
 numeracy -.07 
   
Study 2 decision variance .71** 
 decision speed .21** 
 non-giving .35** 
 numeracy -.30** 
   
Study 3 decision variance .69** 
 decision speed .18** 
 non-giving .25** 
 numeracy -.35** 
 social desirability -.10* 
 
Note. Correlations were calculated using Spearman’s rho. * indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S2. Group comparisons on control var iables across all three studies. 
  
  W         p             d        δ 
Study 1: selfish vs. generous      
 decision variance 1651.5 .30 .34 .11 
 decision speed 1603 .28 .13 .12 
 non-giving 1960 <.001 .95 .32 
 numeracy 1382.5 .50 .26 .07 
      
Study 2: violators vs. upholders      
 decision variance 2037 <.001 1.30 .64 
 decision speed 4862 .08 .09 .15 
 non-giving 4318.5 <.001 .61 .24 
 numeracy 7148.5 <.001 .52 .26 
      
Study 3: violators vs. upholders      
 decision variance 2209.5 <.001 .58 .33 
 decision speed 33735.5 .67 .14 .02 
 non-giving 39401.5 <.001 .54 .20 
 numeracy 37970 .01 .17 .15 
 social desirability 30875 .25 .11 .06 
      
 
Note. Group differences were calculated using Mann-Whitney U-tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S3. Regression results for  Study 2 using recalled giving as the cr iter ion. 
 
Predictor b beta beta 95% CI sr
2  r Fit Difference 
(Intercept) 5.46       
actual giving .94** .94 [.89, .98] .47 .96**   
decision speed .00 .01 [-.02, .05] .00 .13*   
decision variance .06 .02 [-.02, .06] .00 .25**   
non-giving 1.18 .03 [-.03, .08] .00 .67**   
numeracy -5.01 -.03 [-.07, .01] .00 -.08   
      R2   = .927**  
      95% CI[.91,.94]  
        
(Intercept) 3.71       
actual giving .96** .96 [.91, 1.01] .46 .96**   
decision speed .00 .02 [-.01, .06] .00 .13*   
decision variance .01 .00 [-.04, .04] .00 .25**   
non-giving .88 .02 [-.03, .07] .00 .67**   
numeracy -3.53 -.02 [-.06, .01] .00 -.08   
fairness deviation .10** .07 [.03, .11] .00 -.14*   
      R2   = .932** ΔR2   = .004** 
      95% CI[.91,.94] 95% CI[-.00, .01] 
        
 
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents 
unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial 
correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence 
interval, respectively. 
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table S4. Regression results for  Study 3 using recalled giving as the cr iter ion. 
  
Predictor b beta beta 95% CI sr
2  r Fit Difference 
(Intercept) 1.61       
actual giving .93** .92 [.89, .95] .44 .96**   
decision speed .12** .03 [.01, .06] .00 .03   
decision variance .03 .01 [-.01, .03] .00 .07   
non-giving 2.99** .05 [.02, .09] .00 .68**   
numeracy -.18 -.02 [-.04, .01] .00 -.06   
social desirability .02 .00 [-.02, .03] .00 .11**   
      R2   = .921**  
      95% CI[.91,.93]  
        
(Intercept) 1.00       
actual giving .95** .94 [.90, .97] .41 .96**   
decision speed .11* .03 [.01, .05] .00 .03   
decision variance .03 .01 [-.01, .04] .00 .07   
non-giving 3.12** .06 [.02, .09] .00 .68**   
numeracy -.17 -.02 [-.04, .01] .00 -.06   
social desirability .01 .00 [-.02, .02] .00 .11**   
fairness deviation .04** .04 [.01, .06] .00 -.43**   
      R2   = .922** ΔR2   = .001** 
      95% CI[.91,.93] 95% CI[-.00, .00] 
        
 
Note. A significant b-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also significant. b represents 
unstandardized regression weights. beta indicates the standardized regression weights. sr2 represents the semi-partial 
correlation squared. r represents the zero-order correlation. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence 
interval, respectively. 
* indicates p < .05. ** indicates p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplemental References 
 
1.  Konow J (2000) Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. Am 
Econ Rev 90(4):1072–1091. 
2.  Babcock L, Loewenstein G (1997) Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of self-serving biases. J 
Econ Perspect 11(1):109–126. 
 
